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ABSTRACT 
 
Kiyoung Chang: Sleeping with the Enemy: Winning Coalitions against Within-Group 
Power Transitions and Unstable Civil War Settlements 
(Under the direction of Mark Crescenzi) 
 
In many civil wars, each warring side often consists of multiple internal groups. In such a 
case, a leader’s political survival may be threatened not only by fighting with the enemy 
but also by power competition among in-groups. Within-group power transitions refer to 
a situation in which a dominant group is overtaken by a challenger group on the same 
warring side. In this paper, I argue that the risk of within-group power transitions creates 
an incentive to negotiate peace with an enemy side. Assuming recruiting enough 
supporters is the sine qua non of a dominant group’s status, attracting extra supporters 
would provide insurance against internal power transitions. Given the internal power 
competition, negotiated settlements help a dominant leader save more resources to recruit 
additional supporters by minimizing the uncertainty from fighting with an enemy. Thus, 
negotiated settlements are beneficial to control internal rivals. A leader’s consideration 
for such a strategic settlement, however, inevitably entails the risk of the conflict 
recurring.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
In many civil wars, there are often multiple groups that form one warring side: the 
government and the rebels. While many existing studies have explored the issue of how 
to end civil war and to increase durable peace (Fearon 2004; Fortna 2004; Nilsson 2008; 
Walter 2002; Walter 2004), conventional wisdom suggests that it is difficult to end civil 
wars with multiple actors by means of negotiated settlements. As long as there is no 
condition that favors a decisive victory, a multiparty civil war tends to last a long time 
due to fewer acceptable agreements, acute information asymmetries, and shifting 
alliances and incentives (Cunningham 2006; Fearon 2004).                      
In this multiparty civil war, within-groups may engage in competition for 
internal hegemony. Internal power games on the government side are mainly analyzed by 
the selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003), which posits that groups that do not receive private goods under the existing 
regime have the greatest interest in overthrowing an incumbent. On the other hand, 
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scholars argue that the rebels also often compete against not only the government but also 
each other. Each rebel group is in competition to form the dominant rebel group, which 
can dictate the terms of the rebellion (Gates 2002, 127; Weinstein 2005, 619; 
Cunningham 2006, 877-878). Taken together, this multi-party civil war implies that a 
civil war leader should fight against the adversary side, while simultaneously competing 
against an internal rival. To the best of my knowledge, however, the literature tends to 
ignore the internal power dynamics of the government and the rebels in terms of civil war 
settlement characteristics and stability. Internal power dynamics provoke some interesting 
theoretical and empirical questions. Given no favorable conditions for a decisive victory, 
why does a civil war leader have an incentive for a negotiated settlement? If there is a 
negotiated settlement, how can these internal power dynamics influence the post-
settlement risk of conflict?          
In this study, I employ the concepts of the winning coalition and within-group 
power transitions to explain the internal power dynamics of each warring side and a 
leader’s conflict behavior. In my analysis, the winning coalition is a proportion of 
supporters sufficient to sustain a dominant leader in office (Bueno de Mesquita and 
Siverson 1995, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). On the other hand, within-group power 
transitions refer to the situation in which the dominant group is overtaken by the 
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challenger group on the same warring side based on approximate power parity and 
dissatisfaction with the dominant group. Power transition theory maintains that war is 
more likely when a challenger enters into the approximate parity and is dissatisfied with 
the dominant state (Kugler and Lemke 1996; Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980; 
Werner 1999). The concept of within-group power transitions also assumes group-based 
hierarchy inside each warring side. Within-group power transitions can contribute to a 
better understanding of negotiated settlements and post-settlement conflicts by 
underpinning a focus on two key variables: relative power among internal groups and the 
degree of dissatisfaction with the dominant civil war actor.    Unlike power transitions 
in the international system, however, within-group power transitions inside either the 
government or the rebels may create incentives to negotiate peace with an adversary side 
in order to control an internal rival.1
Figure 1 shows my causal mechanism linking the internal power transitions and 
unstable civil war settlements. The imminent within-group power transitions bring out 
more uncertainty to a dominant leader’s political survival. Due to internal power games, a 
 With this negotiated settlement, though, there is a 
relatively good chance the conflict would recur.  
                                            
1 Toft (2007) applies power transition theory to the context of civil war to test the proposition that shifts in 
the distribution of ethnic group populations within a multinational state. She also concludes that the logic of 
power transition theory transports well to the question of the likelihood of civil war.    
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leader has incentives to increase the size of the supporting members because this provides 
insurance against losing office. Given the limited resources to be distributed, a leader is 
more likely to negotiate for peace with an enemy, which helps to consolidate the internal 
leadership by minimizing the uncertainty from fighting. This negotiated settlement, 
however, is unstable for two reasons: first, because the process of the negotiated 
settlement tends to leave out some warring parties, which tends to wreck the peace, and 
second because the original signatories will reconsider conflict after establishing an 
internal hegemony.                                            
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This study has three limited purposes. First, taking the leader-level approach, 
this study aims to develop a rationalist mechanism to understand civil war settlements 
and post-settlement conflicts. A civil war leader is assumed to estimate the expected gains 
from conflict action and compare them with the expected losses. Taking into account the 
returns of civil war outcome, a leader would maintain the minimal coalitions to maximize 
his payoffs. Increased political uncertainty influences the cost function of a civil war 
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leader, however, and creates an incentive to recruit extra supporters. Second, this research 
intends to describe a more dynamic picture of the civil war settlement and post-settlement 
conflict based on a leader’s strategic decision. In my analysis, a leader’s strategic 
consideration leads not only to a negotiated settlement but also to the instability of the 
peace agreement. Third, my study provides empirical support for within-group power 
transitions and unstable civil war settlements. My findings suggest that a leader has the 
incentive to negotiate for peace with an enemy provided a challenge from an internal 
rival and that peace after the negotiated settlement is not very stable.             
The article proceeds as follows. In the following four sections, I develop a new 
framework to analyze the relationship between a leader’s risk of political survival and 
unstable settlements according to the causal mechanism shown in Figure 1. The sixth 
section describes the main variables and the research design. I employ logit and duration 
analysis to examine the effect of within-group power transitions on the negotiated 
settlements and their post-settlement effects, respectively. In the seventh section, I report 
the results of empirical analyses. In the conclusion, I summarize the findings.            
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Political Uncertainty and Threats from Within 
 
Civil war consists of a series of battles over wealth or territory, and people are exposed to 
unpredictable risky events. During conflicts, the government tends to increase spending 
on the military, while focusing less on the public peace. People often suffer from guerrilla 
warfare, terrorism, or irregular violence. Civil war also has a profound effect on economy. 
The increasing war cost from the long dragging war and high commodity prices disrupt 
markets. As a result, the actual volume of transactions will decrease and people can 
become deprived. Given the lack of peace and prosperity, people tend to shorten their 
time horizons and discount the future more heavily as civil war becomes less predictable. 
They become more opportunistic and focus more on current opportunities for profit 
(Collier 2000, 101).   
 If holding office is a primary motivation, a civil war leader needs to minimize 
uncertainty regarding political survival. A defeat in civil war may mean exile, 
imprisonment, or even death to a civil war leader, and the fate of a leader is highly 
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sensitive to the outcome of war. Thus, political uncertainty influences a leader’s conflict 
strategy by affecting costs and benefits of civil war outcome. In a multiparty civil war, a 
leader tends to face higher uncertainty because each actor has a diversity of goals and 
divergent interests. In this case, a leader can have more risk of losing office. Even in a 
multiparty civil war, though, a leader’s perception of uncertainty can vary according to 
the evolution of civil war. During conflicts, a leader’s political survival may also be 
threatened by either internal or external events he does not expect to occur. An 
unexpected involvement of a third party, a rebel leader’s death, a sudden offer of peace 
agreement, or the split of the warring side might influence a leader’s office-seeking. 
Likewise, as political uncertainty can affect the probability of losing office, a leader has 
an incentive to remove uncertainty when possible.       
 Many existing studies regard political uncertainty as one of the critical factors in 
terms of solving conflicts. Scholars argue that conflict may be avoidable when each 
warring side has complete information about resolve or capabilities (Fearon 1995; Powell 
2002). In civil war, each side can never be sure what type its enemy is or overestimate its 
chance for military victory due to the lack of information. As a result, a conciliatory actor 
might bluff to avoid a series of concessions (Walter 2006).  
      Previous literature tends to focus on uncertainty from fighting with an enemy 
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side. Given multiple internal actors, however, political uncertainty can also be generated 
from within. As argued above, many people are not patient enough to consider future 
opportunities, so a government or a rebel leader cannot expect consistent loyalty from the 
supporting group. Through a series of battles, a challenger can increase his capability and 
attempt to remove an incumbent leader. Yesterday’s friend can be today’s enemy.                   
An internal threat can occur on either the government side or the rebel side. 
During protracted conflicts, a government’s capacity to control a challenger on the 
government side weakens. If a state’s weak capacity is a precondition for the protracted 
conflict, a government leader cannot always gain support among opportunistic people in 
civil war.2
                                            
2 Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that, as civil wars are less likely to occur in states with capacity, “state 
capacity” is highly associated with the outcome and the duration of civil wars.       
 Sometimes a rival can threaten an incumbent’s political survival when a 
leader cannot provide what government supporters want. This includes a regime change 
through a legitimate procedure such as an election or use of force such as a military coup. 
On the other hand, conflicts might occur among multiple rebel groups. In civil wars in 
Congo, Sudan, and Columbia, there were multiple insurgent groups with divergent 
preferences. In those countries, the rebels competed against not only the government but 
also each other. Sometimes rebel groups compete with each other to be a dominant rebel 
group in order to dictate the terms of the rebellion and exploit resources to continue the 
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civil war (Gates 2002, 127; Weinstein 2005, 619; Cunningham 2006, 877-878). Thus, the 
political survival of a dominant rebel leader can be threatened by a rival in that both rebel 
leaders compete with each other for securing resources, recruiting supporters, or even 
gaining legitimacy from domestic audiences or the international community for the 
insurgency. Before the 1990s, the Palestinians were represented by the Palestine Liberal 
Organization (PLO), which had monopolized resources and the capacity for mobilization 
to fight against Israel. However, Hamas rose to power and threatened the foundations of 
the PLO’s authority. The rise of Hamas weakened Arafat’s capacity to hold together a 
unified secular nationalist organization with a goal of statehood (Aburish 1998, 321-325). 
In this case, civil war means no more conflicts between the government and one rebel 
group.        
When faced with an internal challenge, the threat from within adds more 
uncertainty about a dominant leader’s tenure and the outcome of civil war. This means a 
leader should fight against his principal adversary while simultaneously competing 
against an internal rival. Waltz (1964; 1979) has argued that bipolarity is associated with 
more certainty because political leaders are better able to judge the preferences of a 
potential adversary. Likewise, the presence of an internal rival brings more uncertainty to 
a dominant leader, indicating holding office might be threatened from within. With regard 
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to the rebels, when there is a dominant rebel group, its leader uses more resources to 
continue civil war because other groups tend to follow what the dominant group does. 
But if a rival rebel group challenges, a dominant group cannot take the initiative in 
rebellion. What is worse, this might decide a leader’s fate. Therefore, a civil war leader 
has more political risk when he faces an internal challenger. Inevitably, the threat from 
within would influence a leader’s expected utility of civil war, and a leader may seek 
conflict behavior to minimize uncertainty about political survival.                                             
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Winning Coalitions and Incentives to Increase the Size 
 
In this section, each warring side consists of three subgroups such as a dominant group, a 
challenger group, and supporters to explain the internal constraints and within-group 
power transitions.3 Following the selectorate theory, I assume that to recruit enough 
supporters is the sine qua non of the status of a dominant group on each warring side.4 
What is different from the selectorate theory is that the rebels are also regarded as one 
independent entity. In other words, both a government leader and a dominant rebel leader 
have an independent “winning coalition”5
                                            
3 According to Cunningham (2006), the multiple-party assumption is helpful for understanding the 
dynamics of the duration of civil wars. He argues that many conflicts in Afghanistan, Colombia, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia have contained more than two 
parties.     
 
4 In many civil wars, rebel-supporting civilians are critical to the rebels. An IRA man’s retrospect shows 
that civilian support is also critical even to the rebels. He says, “Without the community we were irrelevant. 
We carried the guns and planted the bombs, but the community fed us, hid us, opened their homes to us, 
turned a blind eye to our operations” (Collins 1999, 225 quoted in Kalyvas 2006, 92).   
 
5 The winning coalition is usually defined “as a subset of the selectorate of sufficient size such that the 
subset’s support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as 
over the disenfranchised members of society” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 51).    
 in my analysis. In this case, the rebels’ 
winning coalition indicates a portion of the rebel supporters sufficient to sustain the status 
of a dominant rebel group. Like a government incumbent, a rebel leader needs to provide 
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private goods to hold the loyalty of coalition members. To depose a main rebel leader, a 
rival rebel leader also needs to convince a sufficient number of rebel supporters who were 
loyal to a dominant leader to defect to him. The assumption of the winning coalition for 
the rebels is useful for analyzing internal dynamics among multiple rebel groups as the 
above Palestine case shows. Figure 2 shows the winning coalition of a warring side A 
under the risk of within-group power transitions.     
 
FIGURE 2. The Winning Coalition and Within-Group Power Transitions 
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size of the winning coalition. A leader would decide how many supporters are necessary 
for his political survival. When a unilateral victory is expected, a leader focuses on using 
discretionary resources for the war effort rather than spending more on private goods for 
political survival (McDonald 2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). In this case, 
a leader would focus on the current coalition members or attempt to decrease the size of 
the winning coalition through civil war. A leader can sustain his position based on 
minimal winning coalitions. On the other hand, when decisive victory is not expected, 
each leader cannot always keep minimal coalitions. Sometimes a leader needs to draw 
more supporters to continue or win civil war. Logically in prolonged civil war, there are 
two possibilities regarding the size of the winning coalition. First, the size of the winning 
coalition can be increased after civil war. This implies that the previous size of the 
winning coalition is not enough to end continuing civil war. In regimes with small 
coalitions, coalition members have more incentives to be loyal to an incumbent leader. 
Even if all previous coalition members before civil war still support a government leader, 
this size is not large enough to appease people who support the rebels. Second, the size of 
the winning coalition may remain constant after civil war. This implies some of the 
previous members have defected for some reason. For example, an incumbent leader 
might have no capability to provide private goods to his coalition members. Even in 
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democracy with a large winning coalition, not every coalition member always supports an 
incumbent leader. Some members of the winning coalition might defect when they cannot 
expect to receive benefits from the incumbent.6
 Given high levels of uncertainty, however, the first case is more common than 
the second one. If there is no uncertainty, expanding the coalition would be unattractive 
because it includes the surplus members to maintain a leader’s position (Riker 1962; 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Heger and Salehyan 2007). In other words, both a 
government leader and a rebel leader want to build minimal winning coalitions when 
possible in order to reduce the size of payments that must be made to supporters, the 
remainder of which can be privately consumed. When there is less uncertainty, a leader 
can expect that many supporters will stay in the winning coalition as long as private 
goods are continuously granted. Thus, a civil war leader might keep the minimum size of 
the winning coalition. In prolonged civil war, however, the political situation can become 
unpredictable, and each leader has limited information on the exact size of the future 
winning coalition. Taking political uncertainty into consideration, it is hard to manage a 
 In this case, a leader needs to find other 
members to replace those defectors.     
                                            
6 Heger and Salehyan (2007, 387) introduce the argument that even democratic regimes will “provide pork 
to core supporters through measures like subsidies, targeted projects, and favorable contract terms.” This 
implies that other coalition members, except core supporters, rely more heavily on public goods. Thus, if 
those members are not satisfied with the level of public goods or if a rebel leader makes a credible promise 
to provide more benefits, there can be some incentives to defect from the current coalitions.     
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minimal size of the winning coalition. Given high levels of uncertainty, keeping the 
minimal coalition may threaten a leader’s political survival.   
One might argue that a civil war leader fights to sustain the current situation. For 
example, if a rebel leader obtains drug revenues or controls his territory outside the 
control of a recognized government, he might enjoy the continuation of a state of 
lawlessness (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004, 255). Likewise, a civil war leader 
might gain from an ongoing civil war even though this fighting inflicts costs upon society. 
But even in this case, political uncertainty creates incentives to increase the size of the 
winning coalition. People are willing to be insured for the expected value of losses from a 
set of uncertain events. When uncertainty is high enough, it is optimal for a civil war 
leader to increase the size of the winning coalition. Keeping the minimal coalitions would 
be beneficial to minimize the amount the ruler must pay to sustain the base of support at 
the present, but this cannot guarantee a leader’s position in the future. Thus, the high 
level of uncertainty accompanying political risk should be considered in order to 
understand a civil war leader’s behavior. For this reason, it is wrong to assume that a 
leader can always maintain the minimal coalitions.           
The maximum size that a leader will be willing to keep depends on his capability 
and degree of risk aversion. Stinnett (2007) and Indridason (2008) argue that the 
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government leader under uncertainty tends to establish an oversized coalition government. 
For example, both Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Ehud Barak attempted to 
increase the size of the winning coalition under high levels of uncertainty. This 
uncertainty regarding the reliability of coalition members makes political coalitions 
diverge from minimal winning status. Coalitions including extra parties, factions, or 
members can provide a leader with insurance against the risk of collapse of the regime 
(Riker 1962; Luebbert 1986; Stinnett 2007). A civil war leader also needs to prepare for 
the highly uncertain and risky future. A leader has an incentive to win extra supporters 
over to his side, which provides insurance against the unpredictable future.      
The relationship between the size of the winning coalition and political 
uncertainty leads to the conclusion that either a government leader or a rebel leader will 
recruit more supporters given high levels of uncertainty. As argued earlier, the presence 
of an internal rival brings more uncertainty to an incumbent because an incumbent and a 
rival compete with each other for enough supporters to sustain the status of a civil war 
leader. I have argued that the choice of the winning coalition is highly associated with 
political uncertainty during conflicts. Theoretically, a leader should provide some 
resources to attract additional supporters. The next section deals with how a civil war 
leader can achieve more resources for extra supporters.     
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Within-Group Power Transitions and Civil War Settlements  
 
As argued earlier, a civil war leader needs to recruit extra supporters under a high level of 
uncertainty. An internal power competition deepens uncertainty and risk while fighting 
with an adversary. In prolonged civil war, within-group power transitions commonly 
occur on each warring side. During a civil war, a dominant leader may be overtaken by a 
challenger. For this reason, when an internal power transition is expected, a leader 
attempts to accommodate the dissatisfied for political survival. The existence of a 
challenger creates more risks for a leader’s political survival and imposes more 
uncertainty on the expected outcome of civil war. Thus, when a potential rival appears, a 
leader needs to minimize risks and uncertainty from fighting with an adversary and to 
maximize his capability to consolidate internal leadership.                                   
Power transition theory argues that conflict is more likely when the power 
distribution between two actors approaches parity. However, this particular distribution of 
power does not always lead to conflict. If there is joint satisfaction with the status quo, 
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there would be no conflict because satisfied actors have no incentive to challenge the 
status quo (Kugler and Lemke 1996; Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980; Werner 
1999). For this reason, power transition theory focuses on power parity as opportunity 
and negative evaluations of the status quo as willingness (Lemke and Werner 1996). If a 
dominant actor anticipates a rival actor’s challenge, a dominant actor will use his power 
over the power distribution of value in an attempt to preserve his privileged position 
(Bussmann and Oneal 2007, 91).           
During civil war, an internal challenger may increase power and negatively 
evaluate a dominant leader. A series of battles without a decisive victory might be 
advantageous to a challenger. The protracted civil war would not win opportunistic 
people’s hearts, and the frequent fights with an enemy would sap a dominant leader’s 
resources.7
                                            
7 During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the 
Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) formed a united front against Japan. The war against 
Japan greatly weakened the KMT’s military capability. This cooperation was advantageous for the 
beleaguered CPC. In the midst of the guerrilla operations, the CPC heightened popular perception that the 
Communists were in the vanguard of protecting China against Japan, although this operation had limited 
military value.      
                
 As a leader has no resource to accommodate the discontented, a challenger 
tends to have negative evaluations of an incumbent’s leadership. In this case, a challenger 
would wait and pick the time to remove a dominant leader. While fighting with an enemy, 
however, it is costly for a dominant leader to deter an internal challenge beforehand due 
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to the weakened capability. Moreover, the premature use of a punishment mechanism 
might lead supporters to criticize a leader for the abuse of power because people tend to 
consider external danger more seriously.8
To illustrate my argument, Figure 3 shows the tradeoff between guns (G) and 
butter (B) given constant resources (R) (R = G + B). What is crucial is that the tradeoff 
 This may signal the lack of cohesiveness to an 
enemy. For these reasons, it is hard for a civil war leader to use his power to constrain a 
potential rival with power parity and negative evaluations of the status quo.  
Thus, a leader needs to provide private goods to control the discontented on his 
side. A leader has some difficulties providing additional rewards to the potential coalition 
members, however, when there is no decisive victory or suitable outside aides. Thus, 
expected internal power transitions make a leader seek to negotiate peace with an enemy. 
Under the threat from within, a civil war leader has an incentive to minimize risks of 
political survival through negotiating peace with an enemy. A negotiated settlement helps 
a leader spend more on the butter in a “guns vs. butter” trade-off. He may allocate surplus 
resources to drawing additional supporters to maintain his status. By spending less on the 
guns, an incumbent leader can attempt to provide private goods to the targeted supporters.             
                                            
8 The diversionary war theory is also based on this idea. It argues that domestically weakened leaders often 
undertake risky policies under the expectation that personally undesirable developments will take place. 
Even if I follow the basic assumption of this theory, my argument directly contradicts the diversionary 
theory of war because of the different context of the prolonged civil war. The longer civil war lasts, the 
more people suffer from the war costs.      
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ratio between G and B can vary according to civil war situation. Suppose more violence 
is needed at point b, and less violence is needed at a. To fight with an enemy side, a civil 
war leader needs to distribute his resources to produce a large amount of guns (Gb). As 
there are only Bb resources to be distributed to coalition members, a leader can maintain 
relatively minimal coalitions (n). At point b, each member of the winning coalition 
receives Bb/n in private goods and pays a cost c, where Bb represents the resources to be 
provided for private goods, n is the number of supporters in the winning coalition, and c 
is the cost regarding an individual’s safety. Thus, the expected utility of each member is 
Bb/n – c. When a challenger threatens, a leader has an incentive to increase the size of the 
winning coalition (n  n+k). If the tradeoff ratio between G and B does not vary, 
including additional members (k) would lead to a decrease in each member’s expected 
utility (Bb/n - c > Bb/(n+k) - c), thereby decreasing loyalty. By negotiating for peace with 
an enemy side, however, a leader can move point b to point a in the graph below. If 
coalition members are not concerned about their own security and a leader has surplus 
resources (Ba-Bb) to be distributed, more supporters can be included in the winning 
coalition. Each member in a new coalition receives Ba/(n+k) in private goods and does 
not need to pay cost c. Therefore, a leader can recruit more supporters and keep coalition 
members’ loyalty as long as Ba/(n+k) is greater than Bb/n – c.     
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FIGURE 3. Guns vs. Butter Trade-off during Civil War    
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In addition, a leader can expect other benefits from the negotiated settlement, 
which helps strengthen the base of an incumbent’s internal hegemony. First, a leader may 
use the negotiated settlement as an opportunity to raise domestic and even international 
awareness about his leadership. Given the negotiated settlement is a salient event, the 
public or the international community may think that an incumbent who is willing to 
bargain is more “moderate” or at least “less radical.” A leader might attempt to seek 
domestic or overseas recognition through the process of the negotiated settlement. Even a 
leader with low publicity can use the negotiation process to raise awareness. Second, civil 
war tends to be very costly and destructive, and the protracted war can inflict the 
accumulated costs of conflict even on a victor. In this case, the negotiated settlement 
might prevent a potential victor’s expected utility from being reduced.  
As argued above, through the negotiated settlement, a leader may engineer 
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satisfaction within the war-stricken people by rewarding the members of the winning 
coalition. This helps to prevent current supporters’ defection and incorporates the extra 
members required to control a potential rival. At the same time, a leader might attempt to 
gain recognition domestically or internationally as a moderate leader. Thus, a leader 
needs to have a break in fierce fighting and to secure wealth to increase the size of the 
winning coalition.                 
My argument contrasts starkly with the previous approach. While a negotiated 
settlement occurs as a consequence of an internal power transition in this study, existing 
literature posits that the risk of losing office is associated with the use of force. Given an 
internal challenge, the diversionary war theory holds that a political leader tends to 
pursue “gambling for resurrection.” Tir and Jasinski (2008) argue that a domestic 
diversion would be more beneficial and less risky than diverting against another state. 
This domestic diversion scenario is based on three assumptions: leaders with a tenuous 
hold on power, fear among the citizenry, and uncertainty about the true intentions of 
propagators of violence (De Figueiredo and Weingast 1999, 263). The mounting 
unpopularity resulting in the internal challenge might make a civil war leader consider 
more violence to divert people’s attention.9
                                            
9 For example, Gagnon (1995, 165) points out that the war in Yugoslavia occurred by “the provocation of 
 However, this scenario would make sense as 
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long as there would be less political risk after the use of force (Mueller 1973; Cotton 
1987; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Oneal and Tir 2006). During civil war, it is 
hard to use violence to divert citizens’ attention due to the increased political risk. Further, 
the public might “update their beliefs that their leaders may be manipulating their fears 
and are positively predisposed to violence” (Sambanis 2002, 228). Thus, logically, a civil 
war leader is more likely to become dovish under the risk of the internal challenge.                                                   
 Many cases support my argument. Wood (2000) points out that the split of the 
government side in South Africa and El Salvador induced a leader to accept the 
negotiated settlement with the rebels rather than pursue a more hostile strategy. In those 
countries, a government leader had maintained the small size of the winning coalition and 
so a leader could reduce the total size of private goods for supporters and consume the 
remainder privately. Due to the split among the government groups, a leader wished to 
increase the size of the winning coalition. The split of the government side implies some 
members of the previous winning coalition do not show loyalty to an incumbent. If there 
was strong social cohesiveness among the government groups, negotiated settlements 
would not take place.10
                                                                                                                                  
violence by threatened elites.” Milosevic fomented Serbian people’s fear or hatred of an aggressive 
Croatian regime to draw support for war with Croatia.     
  
    
10 Regarding the defection of some members from the previous winning coalition, Wood (2000) focuses on 
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The degree of political uncertainty may vary according to the evolution of civil 
war, and the existence of an internal rival deepens political uncertainty of a leader. Thus, 
potential power transitions in either the rebels or the government can give each civil war 
leader an incentive to negotiate peace with one other. Given limited resources, a series of 
battles may reduce each side’s resources necessary to keep the winning coalition. For this 
reason, a leader attempts to stay in his office through “sleeping with the enemy.”                                                                        
 
Hypothesis 1: When there is a risk of within-group power transitions, a leader is more 
likely to negotiate peace with an adversary.          
 
Hypothesis 2: When one side is under the risk of within-group power transitions, it is 
more likely to make a negotiated settlement.       
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
the persistent mobilization from below to transform elite interests. She argues that elite interests were 
“transformed from coercive agriculture to the commercial and service sectors in the Salvadoran case and 
from reliance on the political control of labor to an accommodation with the market discipline of labor in 
the South African case” (Wood 2000, 19).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
A Strategic Behavior and Unstable Peace  
 
Sleeping with the enemy might lead to a pause in the conflict. Literally, however, this has 
some problems in establishing peace between the government and the rebels. A 
negotiated settlement motivated by within-group power transitions has a relatively good 
chance that conflicts would be escalated again. Each actor has difficulty sticking to peace. 
I believe a leader’s strategic consideration makes it hard for each warring party to stick to 
peace after negotiated settlements.              
 When one side consists of multiple internal actors, it is necessary that those 
actors’ bargaining ranges should overlap each other to end conflicts. Conflicts with 
multiple actors are hard to end because of fewer acceptable agreements, acute 
information asymmetries, and shifting alliances and incentives (Cunningham 2006).11
                                            
11 While his veto player approach emphasizes an internal cohesiveness and an individual capability of each 
rebel faction, my analysis assumes that there is the constant tug of war between an existing leader and a 
challenger inside each warring party over internal hegemony. According to Cunningham, both “original 
rebel groups” and “splinter factions” have the ability to continue the war unilaterally if the other parties to 
the conflict reach an agreement. Because his perspective ignores the internal hierarchy inside the warring 
party, however, it is hard to explain why there is a (perhaps partial or temporary) negotiated settlement 
when there is an internal challenge. In fact, there was a drastic switch in Palestinian attitude towards the 
PLO and Hamas after the 1990s, and this decided the status of a dominant group to represent Palestine. I 
believe this change may influence the PLO’s attempt to negotiate with Israel. But my argument here does 
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For theses reasons, the process of civil war settlements induced by internal disputes tends 
to leave out other groups with divergent preferences. Previous research also maintains 
that excluded factions can threaten the agreement and increase the risk that the 
signatories return to conflict by a consequence of their violence. Excluded groups may 
act like spoilers “who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their 
power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” 
(Stedman 1997, 5). If excluded actors continue to pursue their war, the signatories can be 
influenced by direct spoiler attacks intended to wreck the peace, and it may be more 
difficult for the signatories to stick to peace (Nilsson 2008, 481). Moreover, spoilers can 
influence the credibility of an agreement. When two sides negotiate peace, the problem of 
credible commitment arises because there is uncertainty about whether the other side may 
carry out the bargain. As each party fears being exploited, they are very sensitive to any 
sign that their former enemy will violate an agreement. In such a case, spoilers can use 
force strategically in order to increase fear and foster mistrust between negotiated parties. 
Even if it is not effective in a military sense, a spoiler’s strategic use of force can 
exacerbate doubts among signatories (Kydd and Walter 2002).             
In addition, conflicts might recur by the original signatories. As argued earlier, a 
                                                                                                                                  
not directly contradict the veto player approach.                
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leader attempts to minimize uncertainty through a negotiated settlement when an internal 
challenger comes out. Whether to fight or negotiate is determined by the relative costs 
and benefits of a unilateral victory or a compromise settlement. When each warring party 
believes it can do no better by continuing to fight than by bargaining, a negotiated 
settlement can occur (Walter 2002, 8). This implies that when an internal leadership 
becomes established again, a leader may reconsider his original payoffs of civil war. For 
a better outcome, a leader may try to achieve a decisive victory without any concession. 
When a military coup occurred in 1989, the Sudanese government declared a unilateral 
ceasefire and offered amnesty for all rebels who laid down arms. But three months after 
the government leadership was established, the government rejected the rebels’ demands, 
and the talks broke down.         
One might ask why a leader has an incentive to negotiate peace with an enemy 
leader even when the enemy side is suffering from internal power transitions. A leader 
might consider more violence to make a civil war situation turn to his advantage. Three 
possible scenarios can be suggested to explain a leader’s incentives for a negotiated 
settlement. First, a leader can expect more concessions from an adversary leader during 
the bargaining process. The internal power competition on the enemy side may increase a 
leader’s leverage during the bargaining process. For example, a leader negotiating with 
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one group of the enemy may have the option of starting to bargain with the other. This 
bargaining leverage might lead to more concessions from the enemy side. Second, a 
leader may pursue a strategic negotiation to foster a schism among the enemy groups. In 
many cases, negotiations and the following peace agreement were not seen as valid 
among the other parts of the rebels. In Chad in 2006, FUCD was one out of three groups 
that formed the rebel group, United Front for Democratic Change (UFDD). But when 
FUCD started negotiations with the government, this resulted in an FUCD breakaway 
from UFDD when they signed an agreement with the government. Thus, if the 
government is a strategic actor that looks ahead when it makes decisions, it would have a 
seat at the negotiation table for the purpose of weakening the capability of the rebels. 
This strategic behavior might partly answer why a forward-looking leader has an 
incentive to negotiate peace with an enemy challenged by an internal rival. Third, a 
leader might be concerned if more violence leads to internal cohesion on the enemy side. 
When there are high levels of external threat, people tend to coalesce to face the common 
enemy.12
                                            
12 As pointed out in the previous section, despite this rally around the flag effect, it is hard for a leader to 
manipulate the use of force for diversionary purposes in the context of protracted civil war.  
           
 During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), while the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) and the Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) were 
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competing for territorial advantage in areas not occupied by Japan, they formed a united 
front against the outside threat.13
 
 Likewise, a civil war leader’s strategic consideration 
might lead to temporary peace but entails risks of conflict recurrence. Thus, a peace 
agreement motivated by internal disputes may not lead to long-term peace but rather to a 
temporary reduction in the level of conflict.                                
 
Hypothesis 3: A negotiated settlement motivated by the risk of within-group power 
transitions is less likely to become durable.   
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
13 Chiang Kai-shek was reluctant, but many Chinese pressured him to form a united front with the CPC.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Research Design   
 
First, I examine the impact of within-group power transitions on the likelihood of the 
negotiated settlement of civil war to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. For this empirical analysis, 
I collected data on every civil war between 1989 and 2003 for which there are multiple 
actors in either the government or the rebels included in the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Project (UCDP). My analysis is limited to cases where at least one warring side consists 
of more than one “active” internal group. For the rebel side, I selected the cases where 
each troop size of at least two rebel groups is more than 1000 because to have enough 
supporters may not be very important to small-sized rebel groups. Small-sized rebel 
groups might pay off through looting or terror during conflicts. To apply the concept of 
winning coalitions to the rebels, the rebel group should not only sustain its own system of 
governance but also have the capability to continue the unilateral conflict against the 
government. If at least two rebel groups are able to keep the troop size more than 1000 
through civil war, this implies the rebel force has independent power against the 
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government and that there are many rebel sympathizers. On the other hand, I assume the 
government side originally consists of multiple actors. 14
Second, I conducted the empirical evaluations using duration analysis to test 
Hypothesis 3 regarding the stability of negotiated settlements. I use the dataset of peace 
duration from Nilsson (2008) originating from the UCDP, which provides all peace 
agreements signed by the government and one or several rebel groups. For the rebel side 
analysis, I dropped cases where the conflict involves only two parties. In order to 
consider the effect of internal power transitions on the long-term duration of peace 
following a civil war settlement, I use a Cox proportional hazards model because it does 
not assume any specific probability distribution for the time until an event occurs. This 
 Each multiparty conflict 
represents one case in the analysis and four different models are employed to examine the 
effect of the risk of power transitions in each warring side on civil war settlements. Given 
the dichotomous dependent variable and the structure of the cross-sectional time-series 
data, I use logit regression to estimate the effect of internal power transitions on 
negotiated settlements. To deal with temporal autocorrelation, I include a variable 
counting the number of years since the last event as well as a natural cubic spline of those 
years (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998).                  
                                            
14 A typical example is the military. The military is assumed to originally belong to the government. Thus, 
if military coups occur, this indicates a split between government actors.        
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Hazard-rate analysis predicts duration of successfully negotiated outcomes.       
    
The key independent variable is a civil war leader’s perception of impending within-
group power transitions. But it is not easy to find a proxy for power transitions between 
internal civil war groups in comparison with power transition between major powers in 
the inter-state conflict.
Key Independent Variable: Risk of Within-Group Power Transitions 
15 Thus, I code whether or not a civil war leader perceives the risk 
of power transitions on either side in a given year by the following criteria. There are two 
essential factors to measure power transitions: (1) power parity, and (2) dissatisfaction 
with the status quo. As for power parity between internal actors, I use the troop size of 
each warring party. As the UCDP has annual data on the troop size of each warring party 
from 1989, changes in relative power are used as a proxy for power parity. In this 
analysis, each internal group was coded as having “power parity” if a second largest 
group has more than 80 percent the troop strength of a dominant group.16
                                            
15 For example, to measure states’ power parity, the Correlates of War composite power index includes 
each state’s share of the system’s total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron or steel 
production, military manpower, and military expenditures. On the other hand, states’ dissatisfaction with 
the status quo can be measured by using S score (Signorino and Ritter 1999).          
 
16 In the UCDP data, there are missing data for some of the warring parties. Additionally, these data do not 
show up in any shift in the middle of a year. Thus, it requires a judgment call to code power transitions by 
troop size. Organski and Kugler (1980) use 80 percent of the capabilities of the most powerful country in 
the system as a threshold. In my analysis, when range is used to indicate each troop size, a dominant 
group’s smallest value and a challenger’s largest value are taken to capture the perception of a dominant 
leader’s risk of power transitions.         
 On the other 
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hand, I assume there is a high degree of “dissatisfaction” with a dominant group in the 
following two cases: (1) when a dominant group splits, and (2) when there are military 
clashes between a dominant group and others.17 A dominant group often splits due to 
different policy preferences or leadership disputes (Cunningham 2006). Military clashes 
among internal groups may also occur for similar reasons. In either case, a dominant 
leader’s leadership has been seriously damaged because this means some resources 
(including the size of supporters) that a leader has used are no longer available.18
On the government side, it is infeasible to measure power parity among actors. 
Instead, there are some ways to measure a degree of dissatisfaction with an incumbent 
leader. First, when there is the direct risk of regime change such as an attempted coup, I 
assume there is a high level of dissatisfaction with an incumbent’s leadership. This allows 
me to capture the degree of dissatisfaction with the status quo on the government side in 
as consistent a way as the dissatisfaction on the rebel side. Second, as the state of the 
economy is a commonly cited predictor of a government leader’s popularity, GDP per 
                
                                            
17 As for the government side, an attempted coup is a typical example of the military clashes (or the split 
among government factions) because the military is assumed to belong to the government. For example, on 
16 May 1989 in Ethiopia there was a coup attempt by a military faction to overthrow government leader 
Mengistu Haile Mariam, but it failed and the coup was defeated by Mengistu loyal forces. Likewise, a 
military coup shows there is an internal challenger with different policy preferences in the government side.             
 
18 For example, in 1998, the Burundian insurgent group CNDD-FDD broke from the original group CNDD 
led by Léonard Nyangoma. The CNDD-FDD consisted of the armed wing of CNDD that rebelled against 
the CNDD political leadership in 1998 and followed the new leader Jean Bosco Ndayingengurukiye.   
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capita is a proxy for a leader’s economic performance. To retain office depends on the 
support of coalition members adversely affected by a poor economy. According to 
Londegran and Poole (1990), military coups often follow declines in personal income, 
which may threaten a leader’s position. A government leader may have strong incentives 
to promote economic growth for coalition members (Oneal and Tir 2006, 758). These 
data are taken from Cunningham’s (2006) annual measure of real GDP per capita in 1996 
dollars (log GDP per capita in 1996 dollars), originating from Gleditsch (2002).         
   
In order to see the effect of internal power transitions on the negotiated settlement, two 
dependent variables are employed: a dichotomous measure of a negotiation and a peace 
agreement between the government and the rebels. According to the UCDP, to be 
considered as a negotiation, the talk should involve the conflict party and concern a 
conflict-related issue such as ceasefire. On the other hand, a peace agreement has to be 
signed between at least two opposing primary warring parties active in an armed conflict 
and should concern the incompatibility. The UCDP provides yearly information on each 
dependent variable. Each dependent variable was coded 1 when the government and the 
Dependent Variables 
(1) Negotiated Settlements  
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rebels negotiate for peace and make a peace agreement in any given time period and 
otherwise 0.19
                                            
19 However, sometimes each warring party can declare a unilateral ceasefire successively. For example, the 
Philippine rebel group National Democratic Front (NDF) declared a unilateral temporary ceasefire for 
Christmas and New Year in 1989. The following day, government forces also announced a ceasefire for 
these days. For this reason, I also used a ceasefire with a unilateral announcement as a dependent variable. 
The results show that the risk of internal power transitions still affects the likelihood of the ceasefire.        
     
 
(2) Peace Duration  
In order to examine the duration of a peace agreement signed after the risk of internal 
power transitions, I use two different models to distinguish the spoilers from the original 
signatories. I use Nilsson’s data (2008) originating from the UCDP because her data 
distinguish the overall peace duration from the signatory peace duration. While the 
signatory peace duration measures the number of years of peace from the signing of the 
agreement until the government and any rebel party engage in violence, the overall peace 
duration includes the conflict behavior of a non-signatory to measure the duration of 
peace. In line with my theoretical argument, I use the overall peace duration in order to 
test Hypothesis 3. The dependent variable is an event – the failure of a peace agreement. 
In this analysis, “peace process agreements” are dropped because those are merely 
“outlining a process for regulating or resolving the incompatibility” (UCDP 2006; 
Nilsson 2008, 484).                         
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Control Variables
I consider a number of variables to control for spurious relationships. First, I include a 
variable for diplomatic intervention. Diplomatic intervention is counted when there is 
external diplomatic third-party involvement (mediation) in the conflict. I take these data 
from Svensson (2007), originating from UCDP. Second, when a country is highly 
fragmented, a negotiated settlement tends to be difficult because of divergent preferences 
and fewer acceptable bargaining ranges. Thus, I add a variable for the ethnic 
fractionalization measured by Fearon (2003). The index of the ethnic fractionalization 
ranges from 0 to 1. Third, larger countries tend to have longer civil wars (Fearon 2004). 
The log of country population is used to control for this effect. Fourth, previous literature 
argues that relative capability between the government side and the rebel side is 
important to determine what direction the conflict will take (Buhaug 2006). While 
DeRouen and Sobek (2004) use the size of the government army, I use the total troop size 
of each warring side to measure power parity between the government and the rebels, 
which was calculated as follows: power parity = 1 - abs|(Troop SizeG – Troop 
SizeR)/(Troop SizeG – Troop SizeR)|. When there are outside interventions, foreign 
troops are also added to the total troop size of each warring side. I believe this indicator is 
more useful to assess whether a state’s military capabilities are balanced with those of the 
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rebels. For example, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce (2008) argue that third-party 
interventions on both sides increase the time until a negotiated settlement. But in this case 
we cannot say whether these interventions make relative capability more balanced or less 
balanced (Fearon 2004, 296). Fifth, I include a variable for war costs or the log of 
average deaths per year (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005) because more costly wars tend to 
end more quickly. Sixth, I include the variable regarding the exclusion or inclusion of the 
rebel group. Following the coding rule of Nilsson (2008), exclusive-multiple is coded 1 
when there is one or more excluded warring parties that engages in conflict with the 
government in a given year and otherwise 0. Seventh, I use the dummy variable power-
sharing, which was coded 1 if the peace agreement contained at least one pact regarding 
the power sharing and otherwise coded 0 (Nilsson 2008). Finally, territorial conflicts are 
less likely to experience negotiated settlements than conflicts for the control of 
government. UCDP codes two types of incompatibility. While government conflicts deal 
with regime type and the composition of the government, the incompatibility in territorial 
conflicts concerns the status of a territory and may include demands for secession or 
autonomy (Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen 2006). Thus, in line with previous 
literature and the UCDP coding of the characteristic of civil war, the dummy variable for 
territorial conflicts is included.                    
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
Analysis and Results 
 
In this section, each result is reported by employing two specific methods. First, I report 
the results of tests designed to estimate the effect of the risk of power transitions on the 
likelihood of negotiated settlements. Next, I estimate the duration of the peace agreement 
motivated by the risk of power transitions. As suggested by the theoretical expectation, 
each empirical analysis shows that conflicts where a leader perceives threats within his 
warring side are more likely to be ended through civil war settlements, but those 
negotiated settlements do not guarantee the stability of peace between the government 
and the rebels.                    
 
The Effects of Within-Group Power Transitions on Civil War Settlements
The left side of Table 1 describes the effect of the risk of power transitions on the rebel 
side given the likelihood that the parties will make negotiated settlements. On the other 
hand, the right side deals with power transitions on the government side. Both Model 1 
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and Model 3 show the results of a logit regression with a negotiation as the dependent 
variable to test Hypothesis 1 on each warring side. The total number of observations is 58 
and 95 conflicts respectively. Each presents the effects of impending power transitions on 
the negotiations between each warring side. As predicted, in Model 1, power parity 
between a dominant rebel group and a challenger group has a positive effect on the 
likelihood of negotiations at the conventional level (p < 0.05). Moreover, dissatisfaction 
with a dominant rebel leader has a weak effect on the probability that the government and 
the rebels have negotiations (p < 0.10). Model 3 deals with the risk of power transitions 
on the government side. As in Model 1, it also shows that a government leader’s risk of 
political survival creates incentives to have negotiations with the rebels. These results 
offer strong support for Hypothesis 1.                   
 Model 2 and Model 4 treat a peace agreement as a dependent variable. As a 
peace agreement requires the consent of at least two opposing warring parties, both 
results show that a civil leader also has an incentive to negotiate peace with an enemy 
leader who is under the risk of power transitions. This supports my expectation that a 
forward-looking leader has incentives for negotiated settlements when an enemy side is 
under power competition (H-2). In Model 2, however, I could observe only a significant 
effect of dissatisfaction on the probability of negotiated settlements (p < 0.05). While the 
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power parity does not have a positive result, the effect of dissatisfaction with a dominant 
rebel leader is positively significant even when controlling for the effect of time. Model 4 
also supports Hypothesis 2 on the government side. In both models, the inclusion of the 
years since last settlement yields a significant effect for the likelihood of a peace 
agreement (p < 0.01).              
 Among other control variables, relative capability between the government and 
the rebels serves to increase the likelihood of a peace agreement as Model 4 shows (p < 
0.05). Relative capability influences the probability of one side winning decisively. This 
result indicates that the balance of capability between the government and the rebels 
increases the likelihood of a peace agreement because the probability of stalemate is 
much higher. In Models 1, 2, and 4, mediation serves to increase the likelihood of civil 
war settlements (p < 0.05). Model 3 shows that ethnic fractionalization influences the 
likelihood of a negotiation (p < 0.05). This result shows that as a society is ethnically 
fractionalized, it is hard for warring parties to negotiate for peace. It is somewhat 
reasonable because ethnic fractionalization implies the multiplicity of interests that it 
brings to the bargaining table. However, this variable does not show a significant effect in 
other models. None of the other control variables has a significant effect.       
 For power transitions on both sides, I commonly use the event where a dominant 
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group splits or military clashes occur between internal actors on the same side as a proxy 
for the dissatisfaction with an incumbent leader. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for dissatisfaction in every model suggests that when one warring side is 
undergoing internal dispute, a conflict is more likely to make a civil war settlement. As 
for the government side, GDP per capita does not seem to serve to influence civil war 
settlements. As the dissatisfaction variable reflects more direct risk of an incumbent’s 
political survival than GDP per capita, I can conclude that the internal power dynamics 
inside the government create incentives to negotiate peace with the rebels. As for the 
rebel side, I use the difference in troop size between a dominant group and a challenger 
group as a proxy for power parity. This variable affects the likelihood of civil war 
negotiations.     
 
TABLE 1. Logit Estimates on Civil War Settlements: 1989~2003 
 Rebel Side Government Side 
 
(1)  
Negotiation  
(2)  
Agreement  
(3)  
Negotiation  
(4)  
Agreement  
Power Parity 
(between rebel groups) 
3.201* 
(1.346) 
   
Dissatisfaction 
2.644+ 
(1.362) 
2.714* 
(1.215) 
2.400* 
(1.169) 
2.289* 
(1.135) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-2.347 
(1.981) 
4.897 
(6.903) 
-2.760* 
(1.315) 
2.824 
(2.118) 
Log Real GDP 
1.256* 
(0.558) 
1.141 
(0.766) 
-0.100 
(0.322) 
0.295 
(0.532) 
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Log Battles 
0.231 
(0.507) 
-0.204 
(0.883) 
0.285 
(0.218) 
-0.004 
(0.346) 
Log Population 
-0.040 
(0.272) 
0.100 
(0.422) 
-0.019 
(0.226) 
-0.089 
(0.393) 
Mediation 
3.905* 
(2.204) 
3.365* 
(1.661) 
1.116 
(0.739) 
2.260* 
(1.122) 
Intensity 
0.473 
(1.698) 
1.241 
(1.684) 
-0.240 
(0.742) 
0.499 
(1.162) 
Relative 
Capability 
-1.459 
(2.588) 
1.404 
(1.583) 
1.330 
(1.025) 
2.557* 
(1.289) 
Territory 
0.872 
(1.074) 
-0.585 
(1.164) 
0.070 
(0.623) 
-1.301 
(1.166) 
Year since Last 
Settlement 
 
2.887** 
(1.058) 
 
2.795** 
(1.057) 
Cubic spline 1  
-0.023 
(0.040) 
 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
Cubic spline 2  
0.264 
(0.188) 
 
0.386+ 
(0.217) 
Cubic spline 3  
-0.002 
(0.123) 
 
-0.080 
(0.087) 
Constant -12.225+ 
-20.180* 
(8.338) 
0.513 
(4.160) 
-9.375 
(6.479) 
Observation 58 64 95 93 
Log-Likelihood -24.136 -17.500 -49.806 -26.101 
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors 
+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
To test whether conflicts with many veto players are longer, Cunningham (2006) uses 
three criteria to measure veto players: autonomy, cohesiveness, and viability. Instead of 
using a troop size of 1000, here I employed his three criteria to select the rebel group with 
Robustness Checks 
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enough capability. I dropped the cases where at least two rebel groups are not veto 
players. Models 5, 5-1, and 6 in Table 2 are the result of accepting the criteria of veto 
players. In Models 5 and 5-1, power parity and dissatisfaction are nearly significant at the 
conventional levels (p = 0.057 for power parity, p = 0.056 for dissatisfaction). In Model 6, 
the effect of dissatisfaction with a dominant rebel leader on negotiated settlements is 
highly significant (p < 0.01). The results in Models 5, 5-1, and 6 show that the power 
parity and the degree of dissatisfaction on the rebel side have a significant effect on the 
negotiated settlement even when accepting different criteria.       
More importantly, however, what is less clear at this point is whether the risk of 
within-group power transition leads to the negotiated settlement or vice versa. An internal 
rival group might emerge out of disputes over whether to negotiate with the enemy or 
keep fighting (Cunningham 2006, 878). To deal with the reverse causality, I employed the 
lagged variable of the risk of power transitions. Model 7 and Model 8 in Table 2 address 
this issue by using a one-year lagged variable of power parity and dissatisfaction (p < 
0.01 for one year lagged dissatisfaction, p < 0.05 for one year lagged power parity). 
Nonetheless, the results in Table 2 suggest that the internal power dynamics inside the 
rebel side create incentives to negotiate for peace with the government side even after 
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using a one-year lagged variable of power parity and dissatisfaction on the rebel side.20
TABLE 2. Robustness Analysis: Alternate Estimations of Civil War Settlements: 1989~2003 
    
                         
 
(5) 
Negotiation 
(5-1) 
Negotiation 
(6) 
Agreement 
(7) 
Negotiation 
(8) 
Agreement 
Power Parity  
3.800+ 
(1.996) 
 
   
Dissatisfaction  
1.572+ 
(0.822) 
4.415** 
(1.562) 
  
Power Parity  
(lagged 1 year) 
 
 
 
 
  
2.245* 
(1.044) 
Dissatisfaction 
(lagged 1 year) 
 
 
 
 
 
2.091** 
(0.697) 
1.151 
(1.808) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-1.982 
(2.464) 
-1.746 
(1.801) 
4.337 
(4.015) 
-2.746* 
(1.400) 
5.992 
(7.823) 
Log real GDP 
0.519 
(0.472) 
0.136 
(0.504) 
1.732+ 
(0.903) 
0.032 
(0.325) 
1.474 
(0.933) 
Log Battles 
0.528 
(0.330) 
0.297 
(0.326) 
0.431 
(0.504) 
0.179 
(0.206) 
0.498 
(0.818) 
Log Population 
0.714 
(0.964) 
-0.192 
(0.471) 
-0.088 
(0.556) 
-0.195 
(0.245) 
0.523 
(0.331) 
Mediation 
1.796 
(1.313) 
1.362 
(0.930) 
4.431* 
(2.070) 
1.508* 
(0.761) 
3.308 
(1.913) 
Intensity 
-0.731 
(0.632) 
-0.980 
(0.821) 
1.041 
(1.255) 
0.004 
(0.719) 
0.093 
(1.483) 
Relative 
Capability 
-0.062 
(0.966) 
2.484 
(1.705) 
-0.082 
(1.519) 
0.743 
(1.074) 
2.223 
(1.644) 
Territory 
-0.062 
(0.966) 
0.153 
(0.837) 
-1.496 
(1.232) 
-0.468 
(0.554) 
-1.988 
(1.398) 
Years since Last   3.323*  2.705* 
                                            
20 Unfortunately, when I employed a lagged variable of the risk of power transitions, I could not find a 
significant result on the government side. One possible answer is that the split on the government side can 
last only a couple of months. Fearon (2004) argues that coups lasted 2.5 years on average. If the split on the 
government side lasts less than a year, a one-year lagged variable may not capture a government leader’s 
risk of political survival.                        
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Settlement (1.462) (1.305) 
Cubic spline 1  
 -0.009 
(0.017) 
 
-0.049 
(0.048) 
Cubic spline 2  
 0.377 
(0.235) 
 
0.149 
(0.268) 
Cubic spline 3  
 -0.071 
(0.085) 
 
0.096 
(0.182) 
Constant 
-13.895 
(12.465) 
0.289 
(5.875) 
28.319** 
(9.843) 
1.724 
(4.374) 
-31.759 
(12.812) 
Observations 53 59 59 94 55 
Log-likelihood -24.590 -29.668 -17.822 -49.521 -15.952 
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
+p<0.1,*p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
The Effects of Power Transitions on Peace Duration
TABLE 3. Instability of Peace Agreements 
   
A civil war leader has an incentive to negotiate for peace with an enemy when facing 
threats from within in order to consolidate an internal leadership. However, this peace 
entails the risk of the conflict recurring. As a result of the analysis, I found 20 peace 
agreements motivated by the risk of power transition on either warring side. Table 3 
shows that the same parties returned to violence within five years in 55 percent of cases 
involving peace agreements and that sixteen out of 20 peace agreements did not terminate 
the whole conflict within one year.   
 
Conflict Recurring within 5 years Fail to Terminate the Whole Conflict within 1 year 
55% (11/20) 80% (16/20) 
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 Table 4 describes the risk of post-settlement conflict using duration analysis. 
This analysis finds that the presence of threats from an internal rival before the signing of 
a peace agreement increases the likelihood of a return to civil war after the signing of a 
peace agreement. The duration of overall peace reflects the conflict behavior of both 
signatories and non-signatories after the negotiated settlement. In Model 9, power 
transition in the government has a significant effect on overall peace duration. Internal 
disputes before the signing of an agreement can increase the risk of post-settlement 
conflict by 580% (p < 0.01). Model 10 deals with the relationship between power 
transitions on the rebel side and the risk of post-settlement violence. According to this 
result, negotiated settlements after the internal competition within rebel groups increase 
the risk of conflict recurrence by 340% (p < 0.01). Both results show that it is 
considerably difficult to establish peace between the government and the rebels. Each 
warring party has difficulty sticking to peace. Moreover, in Model 9 and Model 10, the 
exclusive-multiple variable has a significant effect on the risk of post-settlement conflict 
(p < 0.05). It suggests that a negotiated agreement excluding one or more rebel groups 
increases the risk of violence by 244% and 285% respectively. Taken together, these 
findings are consistent with my argument that focuses on the effects of strategic behavior 
on the risk of post-settlement conflict. On the other hand, both results show that power-
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sharing has a significant effect on the establishment of peace (p < 0.01). As can be seen in 
Model 9 and Model 10, when power is shared after a negotiated settlement, the risk of 
peace failing is reduced by 79% and 86%, respectively. This indicates that warring parties 
will sign and implement a peace settlement when their safety is guaranteed (Walter 2002).     
            
TABLE 4. The Risk of Post-Settlement Conflict 
 
(9) 
Overall Peace Duration 
(10) 
Overall Peace Duration 
PT on the Government 
6.810** 
(4.949) 
 
PT on the Rebels  
4.403** 
(2.346) 
Exclusive-multiple 
3.441* 
(1.720) 
3.858* 
(2.213) 
Two-party conflict 
0.799 
(0.450) 
 
Intensity 
1.033 
(0.323) 
0.855 
(0.476) 
Territory 
0.981 
(0.391) 
1.389 
(0.740) 
Power-sharing 
0.212** 
(0.097) 
0.144** 
(0.079) 
Observations 235 138 
No. of Failures 45 35 
Log likelihood -202.299 -136.807 
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
+p<0.1,*p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study makes significant contributions to the literature on civil war settlements and 
peace duration. First, while many of the previous studies have ignored the internal 
dynamics of each warring side, this research finds that an internal dispute within either 
the government or the rebels plays a role in civil war settlements. An individual leader’s 
political survival can be threatened not only by fighting with the enemy but also by 
competing for power with an internal rival who has power parity and negative 
evaluations of the status quo. Second, the framework of the winning coalition provides a 
more dynamic picture of the process of civil war settlements. A civil war leader generally 
cares about the risk of political survival as well as the return of civil war. Considering 
only the outcome of current return of civil war, either a government leader or a rebel 
leader will always try to build minimal winning coalitions when possible because it might 
help to maximize a leader’s utility. A leader should also take into account, however, the 
uncertainty that might affect his political survival. Given high levels of uncertainty, a 
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leader has an incentive to increase the size of the supporters, which provides insurance 
against losing office. Third, this research provides some unique insights into the 
relationship between a leader’s strategic behavior and civil war settlements. A leader’s 
strategic consideration is highly associated with unstable peace after negotiated 
settlements. Spoilers may wreck the peace or signatories may reconsider their original 
payoffs of civil war after establishing an internal leadership. This implies that recurring 
civil war is related to the characteristic of previous bargaining.           
 My empirical analysis also generates several interesting findings. For a test of 
three hypotheses, two specific methods were employed. First, I estimated the influence of 
a civil war leader’s risk of power transitions from within each warring side on the 
likelihood of the negotiated settlements. Second, I also estimated the duration of a 
negotiated settlement motivated by those internal threats. In line with my argument, these 
empirical analyses show that a leader has an incentive to negotiate for peace with an 
enemy when an internal power transition is perceived, but this post-settlement peace 
entails the risk of conflict recurring.               
A warring side which consists of multiple actors does not behave in a unitary manner. 
Thus, it is difficult to end civil wars with multiple actors by means of negotiated 
settlements. However, the policy implications of my findings suggest that power 
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competition among in-groups can lead to a negotiated settlement even under the 
continuing stalemate. Following the logic of within-group power transitions, it would be 
possible to create a temporary peace by fostering internal competition. In this case, 
relations with one group of the warring side might be used as a counterweight to relations 
with another, which may be helpful in leading to negotiated settlements. My findings 
suggest that within-group power transitions might create the eye of the storm 
characterized by a break in fierce fighting in protracted civil war. At the same time, my 
study shows that this eye of the storm in itself cannot guarantee the stability of peace. 
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